December 4, 2021

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Under Secretary Nuland’s Travel to Ottawa, Canada to Participate in the U.S.-Canada High-Level Policy Review Group

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Office of the Spokesperson

Under Secretary for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland will travel November 4 to Ottawa, Canada to co-chair the annual U.S.-Canada High-Level Policy Review Group (HLPRG) with Canadian Assistant Deputy Minister for International Security and Political Director Dan Costello.  Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Brian A. Nichols, Canadian Deputy Assistant Minister for the Americas Michael Grant, and other high-level officials will also participate.

This year’s HLPRG will build on our longstanding partnership, which President Biden and Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau reinforced with the February 23 release of the “Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.-Canada Partnership.”  Launched in 2009, the HLPRG addresses a range of issues that reflect the breadth of our partnership and common interests in security and prosperity within and beyond our borders.

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