January 23, 2022

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Timor-Leste National Day

14 min read

Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State

On behalf of the United States of America, I would like to extend our congratulations on the celebration of Timor-Leste’s Restoration of Independence Day.  During the 19 years since independence has been restored, Timor-Leste has made enormous progress to build democratic institutions and ensure human rights are upheld.  The United States has been proud to partner with Timor-Leste since its independence and we look forward to advancing and strengthening our strong bilateral relationship.

Our relationship maintains shared values of mutual respect, friendship, and cooperation. These shared values provide the foundation for continued collaboration to promote democracy, human rights, and improving the lives of the Timorese people.  While the past year has presented challenges, including the COVID-19 pandemic, I am confident that the spirit of cooperation between Timor-Leste and the United States will endure and that brighter days are ahead for both of our countries.

As a friend and partner, the United States congratulates the people of Timor-Leste on your Restoration of Independence Day.

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Examples of quantum computing hardware Some quantum computing and communications technologies are available for limited uses, but will likely require extensive development before providing significant commercial value. For example, some small error-prone quantum computers are available for limited applications, and a quantum communications technology known as quantum key distribution can be purchased. According to agency officials and stakeholders, additional quantum technology development may take at least a decade and cost billions, but such estimates are highly uncertain. Quantum computing and communications technologies will likely develop together because of some shared physics principles, laboratory techniques, and common hardware.  Quantum computers may have applications in many sectors, but it is not clear where they will have the greatest impact. Quantum communications technologies may have uses for secure communications, quantum networking, and a future quantum internet. Some applications—such as distributed quantum computing, which connects multiple quantum computers together to solve a problem—require both quantum computing and communications technologies. Potential drawbacks of quantum technology include cost, complexity, energy consumption, and the possibility of malicious use. GAO identified four factors that affect quantum technology development and use: (1) collaboration, (2) workforce size and skill, (3) investment, and (4) the supply chain. The table below describes options that policymakers—legislative bodies, government agencies, standards-setting organizations, industry, and other groups—could consider to help address these factors, enhance benefits, or mitigate drawbacks of quantum technology development and use. Policy Options to Help Address Factors that Affect Quantum Technology Development and Use, or to Enhance Benefits or Mitigate Drawbacks Policy options and potential implementation approaches Opportunities Considerations Collaboration (report p. 37) Policymakers could encourage further collaboration in developing quantum technologies, such as collaboration among: Scientific disciplines Sectors Countries Collaboration among disciplines could enable technology breakthroughs. Collaboration could help accelerate research and development, as well as facilitate technology transfer from laboratories to the private sector, federal agencies, and others. International collaboration could bring mutual benefits to the U.S. and other countries by accelerating scientific discovery and promoting economic growth. Intellectual property concerns could make quantum technology leaders reluctant to collaborate. Institutional differences could make collaboration difficult. Export controls may complicate international collaboration, but are also needed to manage national security risks. Workforce (report p. 39) Policymakers could consider ways to expand the quantum technology workforce by, for example: Leveraging existing programs and creating new ones Promoting job training Facilitating appropriate hiring of an international workforce who are deemed not to pose a national security risk Educational programs could provide students and personnel with the qualifications and skills needed to work in quantum technologies across the private sector, public sector, and academia. Training personnel from different disciplines in quantum technologies could enhance the supply of quantum talent. International hiring could allow U.S. quantum employers to attract and retain top talent from other countries. Efforts to increase the quantum technology labor force may affect the supply of expertise in other technology fields with high demand. It may be difficult to adequately develop workforce plans to accommodate quantum technology needs. International hiring could be challenging because of visa requirements and export controls, both in place for national security reasons. Investment (report p. 41) Policymakers could consider ways to incentivize or support investment in quantum technology development, such as: Investments targeted toward specific results Continued investment in quantum technology research centers Grand challenges to spur solutions from the public More targeted investments could help advance quantum technologies. These may include investments in improving access to quantum computers and focusing on real-world applications. Quantum technologies testbed facility investments could support technology adoption, since testbeds allow researchers to explore new technologies and test the functionality of devices. Grand challenges have shown success in providing new capabilities and could be leveraged for quantum technologies. It may be difficult to fund projects with longer-term project timeframes. A lack of standards or, conversely, developing standards too early, could affect quantum technology investments. Without standards, businesses and consumers may not be confident that products will work as expected. Developing standards too early may deter the growth of alternative technology pathways. Supply Chain (report p. 43) Policymakers could encourage the development of a robust, secure supply chain for quantum technologies by, for example: Enhancing efforts to identify gaps in the global supply chain Expanding fabrication capabilities for items with an at-risk supply chain A robust supply chain could help accelerate progress and mitigate quantum technology development risks by expanding access to necessary components and materials or providing improved economies of scale. Quantum material fabrication capabilities improvements could ensure a reliable supply of materials to support quantum technology development. Facilities dedicated to producing quantum materials could help support scalable manufacturing of component parts needed for quantum technology development. The current quantum supply chain is global, which poses risks. For example, it is difficult to obtain a complete understanding of a component’s potential vulnerabilities. Some critical components, such as rare earths, are mined primarily outside of the U.S., which may pose risks to the supply chain that are difficult to mitigate. Quantum manufacturing facilities take a long time to develop and can be costly. Source: GAO. | GAO-21-104422 Why GAO Did This Study Quantum information technologies could dramatically increase capabilities beyond what is possible with classical technologies. Future quantum computers could have high-value applications in security, cryptography, drug development, and energy. Future quantum communications could allow for secure communications by making information challenging to intercept without the eavesdropper being detected. GAO conducted a technology assessment on (1) the availability of quantum computing and communications technologies and how they work, (2) potential future applications of such technologies and benefits and drawbacks from their development and use, and (3) factors that could affect technology development and policy options available to help address those factors, enhance benefits, or mitigate drawbacks. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed key reports and scientific literature; interviewed government, industry, academic representatives, and potential end users; and convened a meeting of experts in collaboration with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 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