December 9, 2021

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Thirteen Defendants Plead Guilty in $126 Million Compounding Fraud Scheme

13 min read
<div>Thirteen defendants, including three compounding pharmacy owners, three physicians, two pharmacists, and three patient recruiters, pleaded guilty in the Southern District of Texas to a years-long, multi-state scheme to defraud the U.S. Department of Labor’s (DOL) Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) and TRICARE.</div>
Thirteen defendants, including three compounding pharmacy owners, three physicians, two pharmacists, and three patient recruiters, pleaded guilty in the Southern District of Texas to a years-long, multi-state scheme to defraud the U.S. Department of Labor’s (DOL) Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) and TRICARE.

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Forensic chemical analysis and identification (i.e., Step 2 of Fig.1) is mature for known chemical agents. For example, investigators determined the nerve agent sarin was used in an attack on civilians in 2017. The methods can also identify new agents, as when investigators determined the chemical composition of the Novichok nerve agent after its first known use, in 2018. Forensic chemical analysis and identification methods are also mature enough to generate data that investigators could use as a "chemical fingerprint"– that is, a unique chemical signature that could be used in part to attribute a chemical weapon to a person or entity. For example, combining gas chromatography and mass spectrometry can provide reliable information about the chemical components and molecular weight of an agent. To achieve Step 3, scientists could use this these methods in a laboratory experiment to match impurities in chemical feedstocks of the weapon to potentially determine who made it. 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