January 19, 2022

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Sudan’s State Sponsor of Terrorism Designation Rescinded

22 min read

Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State

Today, Sudan’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism is officially rescinded.  This represents a fundamental change in our bilateral relationship toward greater collaboration and support for Sudan’s historic democratic transition.  This achievement was made possible by the efforts of Sudan’s civilian-led transitional government to chart a bold new course away from the legacy of the Bashir regime and, in particular, to meet the statutory and policy criteria for rescission.

We commend the calls of the Sudanese people for freedom, peace, and justice, and we congratulate the members of the civilian-led transitional government for their courage in advancing the aspirations of the citizens they serve.

More from: Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State

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  • Medicaid Home- and Community-Based Services: Evaluating Covid-19 Response Could Help CMS Prepare for Future Emergencies
    In U.S GAO News
    What GAO Found COVID-19 presented risks to Medicaid home- and community-based services (HCBS) programs, where providers help beneficiaries with daily activities, such as bathing, dressing, and eating. To maintain access to services and prevent disease spread, all states received approval for temporary changes to their HCBS programs from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), within the Department of Health and Human Services. These changes enabled selected states to limit in-person contact to reduce the spread of the disease, but also led to new challenges to ensuring beneficiary health and welfare. Examples of Temporary Changes to States' Medicaid Home- and Community-Based Services Due to COVID-19, as of December 2020 CMS focused on supporting states' implementation of temporary changes and conducted limited oversight of the effects of the changes. CMS's Pandemic Plan establishes the need for monitoring to make mid-course corrections and conducting evaluations after the pandemic to inform future emergency response. CMS relied on states to monitor during the emergency. CMS has no procedures for monitoring temporary changes during an emergency. Instead, states had the primary responsibility to monitor the effects of temporary changes during the COVID-19 emergency, according to CMS officials. CMS provided limited guidance to states on monitoring the changes, and did not request that states share any data, such as COVID-19 infections or deaths, with CMS. Without developing monitoring procedures in advance of future public health emergencies, CMS is unlikely to conduct necessary monitoring. CMS's plan for evaluating after the emergency is unclear. CMS officials told GAO that they intend to evaluate temporary changes made to HCBS programs, but had not developed plans to do so. Officials said they will continue to review regular state reporting on steps taken to ensure the overall quality of HCBS programs. However, this reporting may not provide useful information for evaluating how temporary changes affected access to HCBS or the prevention of disease spread, and some reports are not due for more than 3 years. Without a full evaluation, CMS may miss opportunities to better prepare for future emergencies. Why GAO Did This Study During emergencies, including COVID-19, CMS may approve certain temporary changes to states' Medicaid programs to ensure access to care. These changes are critical to beneficiaries who rely on HCBS to perform daily activities, such as eating, and who may face greater risk of COVID-19. The CARES Act includes a provision for GAO to report on its ongoing COVID-19 monitoring and oversight efforts. In addition, GAO was asked to examine temporary changes to Medicaid in response to COVID-19. This report (1) describes temporary changes to Medicaid HCBS programs, including selected states' experience in making these changes; and (2) examines CMS's monitoring and evaluation of the effects of those changes. GAO reviewed documentation of temporary changes approved by CMS and relevant CMS policies, procedures, and analyses. GAO also interviewed Medicaid officials from CMS and six states selected based on variation in Medicaid expenditures and geographic region. GAO assessed CMS's monitoring and evaluation activities using CMS's Pandemic Plan and federal internal control standards.
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  • Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers: Observations on the Navy’s Hybrid Electric Drive Program
    In U.S GAO News
    In 2009, the Secretary of the Navy set goals to reduce fuel consumption and, 2 years later, initiated a program to install Hybrid Electric Drive (HED) systems on its fleet of Arleigh Burke class (DDG 51 Flight IIA) destroyers. The HED system draws surplus power from the ship's electric system and uses it to propel the ship. This allows the crew to turn off the propulsion engines and save fuel. Since 2011, Navy officials told us that they have spent over $100 million on the development, purchase, and upgrade of six HED systems. In October 2018, the Navy completed installation of one of the systems on the USS Truxtun (DDG 103). However, the Navy has yet to install the remaining five HED systems and now plans to use them to support another research effort. The Navy issued a January 2020 report to Congress on the HED system installed on the USS Truxtun, but did not include some requested information. For example, while the report included performance information from operations on board the USS Truxtun, it did not include sufficient information to determine the overall performance of the HED system. A comprehensive test and evaluation could have assessed the system's performance, reliability, and cyber survivability to inform program decision-making. Further, the report did not include a summary of planned investment that includes: an assessment of the costs and benefits of the HED system, or a projection of the funding needed to execute the program. The Navy stated that it did not include a summary of the planned investments in the report because the HED program was not included in the President's fiscal year 2020 budget and also due to the need for additional HED data. However, Congress appropriated $35 million in funding for the HED program in 2020, which was available to support ship installation of the five previously purchased HEDs. The Navy stated that it can only use a small portion of this funding before it expires in September 2022 since the systems cannot be upgraded and incorporated into a ship's maintenance schedule in the next 3 years. In summer 2020, Navy requirements officials informed GAO and Congress that they plan to suspend the HED program and send the five surplus HED systems to support research into a new electric motor, known as Propulsion Derived Ship Service (PDSS). Navy requirements officials identified several reasons for suspending the HED program, but these reasons differ from information GAO obtained during the course of this review. For example: Navy officials stated that it is expensive to maintain the HED system. However, the commanding officer and crew of the USS Truxtun and senior Navy engineers stated that the system requires little maintenance. Navy officials also stated that the HED is not used very often in operations. According to the Navy's January 2020 report, the system was designed for low-speed operations (speed up to 11 knots), which comprise more than one-third of a typical DDGs operating profile. GAO did not assess the Navy's decision to use the HED systems for PDSS research because the Navy did not have documentation regarding the requirements, testing, schedule, or costs of the PDSS effort. GAO could not determine the merits of suspending the HED program and using the other five HED systems for the PDSS effort because the Navy has yet to complete analysis that determines the costs, benefits, and performance necessary to support such a decision. If the Navy completes a further assessment—which has been requested by Congress—it could provide the information necessary to inform future decisions about the HED program. This report assesses the Navy's HED program. Senate Report 115-262 accompanying the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 asked the Navy to submit a report on the HED system installed on the USS Truxtun. GAO was asked to review the Navy's report and the Navy's recent decision to suspend the HED program to pursue the PDSS research project. This report (1) examines the extent to which the Navy's report on the USS Truxtun included information regarding the assessment areas as requested by Congress; and (2) describes the Navy's decision to suspend the HED program and use the HED systems for the PDSS research effort. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed the Navy's 2020 report on the HED system, analyzed data and documentation the Navy used to guide investments, and assessed HED performance information. GAO also interviewed relevant Navy officials, such as the commanding officer and other senior crew of the USS Truxtun, and Navy engineers. GAO is not making any recommendations. For more information, contact Shelby S. Oakley at (202) 512-4841 or oakleys@gao.gov.
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  • Warfighter Support: DOD Should Have a More Comprehensive Approach for Addressing Urgent Warfighter Needs
    In U.S GAO News
    This testimony discusses the challenges that the Department of Defense (DOD) faces in fulfilling urgent operational needs identified by our warfighters. Over the course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces have encountered changing adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures, which challenged DOD to quickly develop and provide new equipment and new capabilities to address evolving threats. Further, U.S. troops faced shortages of critical items, including body armor, tires, and batteries. DOD's goal is to provide solutions as quickly as possible to meet urgent warfighter needs to prevent mission failure or loss of life. To meet its urgent needs, DOD had to look beyond traditional acquisition procedures, expand the use of existing processes, and develop new processes and entities designed to be as responsive as possible to urgent warfighter requests. In addition to requests for equipment from DOD's existing stocks, warfighters have requested new capabilities, such as: technology to counter improvised explosive devices (IED); technology related to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to provide increased situational awareness; and equipment related to command and control to enhance operations on the battlefield. In meeting urgent needs, it is important for DOD to efficiently use the department's financial resources. DOD has spent billions of dollars over the past several years to address urgent warfighter needs. Our past work on weapons acquisition has shown that the department has often pursued more programs than its resources can support. Additionally, our past work also has shown that DOD has had difficulty translating needs into programs, which often has led to cost growth and delayed delivery of needed capabilities to the warfighter. Today, we are publicly releasing a report that addresses (1) what entities exist within DOD for responding to urgent operational needs, and the extent to which there is fragmentation, overlap, or duplication; (2) the extent to which DOD has a comprehensive approach for managing and overseeing its urgent needs activities; and (3) the extent to which DOD has evaluated the potential for consolidations of its various activities and entities. This statement will first briefly discuss challenges we reported in April 2010 that affected the overall responsiveness of DOD's urgent needs processes and then highlight the key findings and recommendations of today's report. Today's report contributed to our findings in another report being released today that addresses opportunities to reduce potential duplication in government programs.We reported in April 2010 on several challenges that affected DOD's responsiveness to urgent needs: (1) Training: We found challenges in training personnel that process urgent needs requests. For example, we found that while the Army required selected officers to attend training on how to address requirements and identify resources for Army forces, officers at the brigade level responsible for drafting and submitting Army and joint urgent needs requests--and those at the division level responsible for reviewing the requests prior to submission for headquarters approval--were not likely to receive such training.(2) Funding: We found that funding was not always available when needed to acquire and field solutions to joint urgent needs. This result occurred in part because the Office of the Secretary of Defense had not given any one organization primary responsibility for determining when to implement the department's statutory rapid acquisition authority or to execute timely funding decisions. (3) Technical maturity and complexity: We found that attempts to meet urgent needs with immature technologies or with solutions that are technologically complex could lead to longer time frames for fielding solutions to urgent needs. Also, we found that DOD guidance was unclear about who is responsible for determining whether technologically complex solutions fall within the scope of DOD's urgent needs processes. In our report being released today, we identified cases of fragmentation, overlap, and potential duplication of efforts of DOD's urgent needs processes and entities. However, the department is hindered in its ability to identify key improvements to its urgent needs processes because it does not have a comprehensive approach to manage and oversee the breadth of its efforts. Many of these entities were created, in part, because the department had not anticipated the accelerated pace of change in enemy tactics and techniques that ultimately heightened the need for a rapid response to the large number of urgent needs requests submitted by the combatant commands and military services. While many entities started as ad hoc organizations, several have been permanently established. DOD has taken some steps to improve its fulfillment of urgent needs. These steps include developing policy to guide joint urgent need efforts, establishing a Rapid Fielding Directorate to rapidly transition innovative concepts into critical capabilities, and working to establish a senior oversight council to help synchronize DOD's efforts. Despite these actions, the department does not have a comprehensive approach to manage and oversee the breadth of its activities to address capability gaps identified by warfighters in-theater. In addition to not having a comprehensive approach for managing and overseeing its urgent needs efforts, DOD has not conducted a comprehensive evaluation of its urgent needs processes and entities to identify opportunities for consolidation. Given the overlap and potential for duplication we identified, coupled with similar concerns raised by other studies, there may be opportunities for DOD to further improve its urgent needs processes through consolidation. In the report we publicly release today, we make several recommendations to promote a more comprehensive approach to planning, management, and oversight of DOD's fulfillment of urgent needs. In summary, we are recommending that: (1) DOD develop and promulgate DOD-wide guidance across all urgent needs processes that establishes baseline policy for the fulfillment of urgent needs, clearly defines common terms, roles, responsibilities, and authorities, designates a focal point to lead DOD's urgent needs efforts, and directs the DOD components to establish minimum urgent needs processes and requirements; and (2) DOD's Chief Management Officer evaluate potential options for consolidation to reduce overlap, duplication, and fragmentation, and take appropriate action.
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  • Defense Logistics: Greater Awareness of Recommendations and Improvements in Data Quality Needed to Resolve Container-Management Challenges
    In U.S GAO News
    What GAO Found Since the early years of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to improve container management in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility have included either updating existing or developing new container-management policy and guidance. However, the department cannot provide reasonable assurance that all recommendations addressing container management in the CENTCOM area of responsibility have been incorporated in DOD's policy or guidance, as appropriate. DOD officials incorporated some recommendations made by DOD audit agencies and other organizations aimed at improving container management into policy and guidance. For example, in August 2012 the commanders of CENTCOM and U.S. Transportation Command issued a joint memorandum outlining leadership's responsibility for container management in the CENTCOM area of responsibility that was a direct result of a 2012 Joint Logistics Board report that recommended corrective actions to enhance senior leaders' understanding of container management. However, DOD does not have a comprehensive list of the corrective actions that have been recommended over time. Without such a list, DOD cannot reasonably ensure that all of the recommendations have been incorporated into policy and guidance as appropriate. For example, of the 95 corrective actions that GAO identified from reports by DOD audit agencies and other organizations issued from 2003 through 2013, DOD officials could not provide information on steps taken to address 40 of the corrective actions. Since 2012, DOD has taken steps to manage and reduce shipping container detention fees incurred due to the untimely return of commercial carrier-owned shipping containers in Afghanistan, but its ability to manage and reduce these fees is limited by inaccurate and incomplete data. In August 2012, DOD established the requirement that within 15 days of a shipping container's arrival: (1) receipt of the container was to be recorded by the unit in-theater, (2) the container was to be unloaded, and (3) the responsible carrier was to be notified that its container was available for pickup. DOD also developed a set of tracking metrics to monitor progress in meeting this requirement. However, incomplete and inaccurate data about the location and number of containers accruing detention fees hindered DOD's ability to manage and reduce detention fees for containers in Afghanistan. For example, GAO analysis of DOD's container-management system data and carrier delivery data for each month in 2013 showed that DOD had not recorded in the container-management system about 16 percent of the carrier-owned containers delivered and received in Afghanistan. DOD has identified factors, or procedural weaknesses, that may contribute to incomplete and inaccurate data; however, it has not assessed the extent to which these weaknesses have contributed to data inaccuracies, determined the root causes of these weaknesses, or developed a corrective-action plan for correcting them. Without an assessment of the root causes and a corrective-action plan, it will be difficult for DOD to have complete and accurate data, which could limit its ability to manage and reduce detention fees for containers in Afghanistan and in future contingency operations. Why GAO Did This Study DOD uses DOD or commercial carrier shipping containers to transport supplies worldwide. Container management has been a long-standing challenge. DOD has paid detention fees of about $823 million from 2003 through 2012 for retaining containers longer than allowed, primarily due to operations within CENTCOM, including Afghanistan, where fees continue to accrue. GAO was asked to review DOD's efforts to address container-management challenges and the accumulation of detention fees. This report assesses the extent to which (1) DOD policy and guidance incorporate recommendations addressing container-management challenges in CENTCOM's area of responsibility, and (2) DOD has managed and reduced detention fees for containers in Afghanistan since 2012. GAO reviewed prior audit reports to identify container-management recommendations; analyzed data such as container type and ownership from 2010 through 2013; and interviewed DOD officials.
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  • Commercial Shipping: Information on How Intermodal Chassis Are Made Available and the Federal Government’s Oversight Role
    In U.S GAO News
    What GAO Found Containerized shipping—performed by oceangoing vessels using standardized shipping containers—accounted for approximately 60 percent of all world seaborne trade, which was valued at approximately $12 trillion in 2017. At a port, shipping containers are placed on "intermodal chassis" (chassis), standardized trailers that carry shipping containers and attach to tractors for land transport. Multiple entities are involved in the movement of shipping containers, including intermodal equipment providers (IEP) (which own and provide chassis for a fee); ocean carriers (which transport cargo over water); and motor carriers (which transport shipping containers over land via chassis). Four distinct models are used in the U.S. to make chassis available to motor carriers (see table), each with benefits and drawbacks according to the entities GAO interviewed. While chassis are generally provided to motor carriers using one of these four models, more than one model may be available at a port. Chassis Provisioning Models Model 1: Single chassis provider An individual intermodal equipment provider (IEP) owns chassis that are directly provided to shippers or motor carriers. Model 2: Motor carrier-controlled A motor carrier owns or is responsible for a chassis that it has procured under a long-term lease. Model 3: Gray pool A single manager, often a third party, oversees the operations of a pool that is made up of chassis contributed by multiple IEPs. Model 4: Pool-of-pools Each IEP manages its respective chassis fleet, but each allow motor carriers to use any chassis among the fleets and to pick up and drop off chassis at any of the IEPs’ multiple locations. Source: GAO.  |  GAO-21-315R Entities GAO interviewed identified multiple benefits and drawbacks to each of the chassis provisioning models. Regarding benefits, for example, both the single chassis provider model and the motor carrier-controlled model allow IEPs and motor carriers to have direct control over the maintenance and repair of their chassis, something these entities potentially lose under other chassis provisioning models. Further, the gray pool and the pool-of-pools models can resolve many of the logistical concerns regarding the availability of chassis, leading to operational efficiencies for port operators and the ability of motor carriers to choose whatever chassis they wish. Regarding drawbacks, cost considerations were identified in some cases. For example, under the single chassis provider model, two IEPs told us that while an expected part of the business, repositioning chassis to ensure there is a sufficient supply of chassis where they are needed can be costly to the IEPs. The federal government provides oversight of chassis safety but has a limited economic oversight role regarding chassis. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) employs several inspection methods to help oversee chassis safety and compliance with regulations. For example, inspectors perform roadside inspections on commercial vehicles, including chassis, in operation. FMCSA also performs investigations of individual IEPs to oversee chassis safety. While one stakeholder GAO spoke with stated that FMCSA should consider maintaining safety ratings for IEPs—as is currently done for motor carriers—FMCSA officials told us that the current processes provide sufficient information to select IEPs for investigation. The Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) oversees ocean carriers that provide service to and from the U.S. and works to ensure a competitive and reliable ocean transportation supply system. Entities may file complaints with FMC to allege violations of the Shipping Act of 1984, as amended. One such complaint was filed in August 2020, in which the complainants allege, among other things, that although ocean carriers do not own chassis, they still control the operation of chassis pools at ports. An initial decision on this complaint is expected in August 2021. None of the entities GAO spoke with identified additional actions they would like for FMC to take regarding chassis. Why GAO Did This Study Senate Report 116-109—incorporated by reference into the explanatory statement accompanying the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020—contained a provision for GAO to study intermodal chassis. Within the U.S., some entities have expressed concerns about chassis, including limited availability of chassis in some circumstances, as well as the age and safety of chassis. This report describes selected stakeholders' views on: (1) the ways in which chassis are made available for the movement of shipping containers and the benefits and drawbacks of those models, and (2) the federal government's role in the chassis market. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed relevant reports on chassis provisioning and federal oversight. GAO interviewed representatives from FMC, FMCSA, five industry associations, and the three largest intermodal equipment providers. GAO also interviewed three ocean carriers, five port operators, and a motor carrier selected, in part, for their large number of container movements. The information obtained from these interviews provides a broad perspective of relevant issues but is not generalizable to all entities. For more information, contact Andrew Von Ah at (202) 512-2834 or vonaha@gao.gov.
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