January 23, 2022

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Secretary Blinken’s Call with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg

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Office of the Spokesperson

The below is attributable to Spokesperson Ned Price:

Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken spoke today with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to discuss the centrality of the Transatlantic bond and Alliance unity as NATO addresses existing and emerging global challenges.  They agreed the new NATO Strategic Concept will be essential to NATO’s continued adaptation over the coming decade.  Secretary Blinken and Secretary General Stoltenberg underscored the value of NATO’s partnerships with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea.  They also discussed the importance of Allied unity in our approach to developments regarding Afghanistan.

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