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Readout of Acting Attorney General Monty Wilkinson, FBI Director Christopher Wray and Assistant to the President for Homeland Security Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall from the Funeral of FBI Special Agent Daniel Alfin

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<div>Acting United States Attorney General Monty Wilkinson, FBI Director Christopher Wray and President Joe Biden’s Homeland Security Advisor Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall represented the United States Government’s official delegation today at the funeral service for fallen FBI Special Agent Daniel Alfin in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. </div>
Acting United States Attorney General Monty Wilkinson, FBI Director Christopher Wray and President Joe Biden’s Homeland Security Advisor Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall represented the United States Government’s official delegation today at the funeral service for fallen FBI Special Agent Daniel Alfin in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. 

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