Do not travel Indonesia due to COVID-19, terrorism, and natural disasters.
Read the Department of State’s COVID-19 page before you plan any international travel.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has issued a Level 3 Travel Health Notice for Indonesia due to COVID-19.
Indonesia has lifted stay at home orders, and resumed some transportation options and business operations. Visit the Embassy’s COVID-19 page for more information on COVID-19 in Indonesia.
Reconsider travel to:
- Central Sulawesi and Papua due to civil unrest.
Terrorists continue plotting possible attacks in Indonesia. Terrorists may attack with little or no warning, targeting police stations, places of worship, hotels, bars, nightclubs, markets/shopping malls, and restaurants. Natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis or volcano eruptions may result in disruptions to transportation, infrastructure, sanitation, and the availability of health services.
Read the country information page.
If you decide to travel to Indonesia:
Central Sulawesi and Papua – Reconsider Travel
Shootings continue to occur in the area between Timika and Grasberg in Papua. In Central Sulawesi and Papua, violent demonstrations and conflict could result in injury or death to U.S. citizens. Avoid demonstrations and crowds.
The U.S. government has limited ability to provide emergency services to U.S. citizens in Central Sulawesi and Papua as U.S. government employees must obtain special authorization before traveling to those areas.
Last Update: Reissued with updates to COVID-19 information.
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Since our 2005 report, we have monitored DOD's progress in managing the DIMHRS program under the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. Specifically for this report, our objective was to determine to what extent DOD has effectively communicated the DIMHRS's capabilities to the Army in order for the Army to prepare for deployment of the system in March 2009.DOD has taken some recent steps to improve communications with the Army about DIMHRS's capabilities in an effort to better prepare the Army for deployment of the system in March 2009. However, Army officials still have some concerns about the extent to which Army requirements are being incorporated into DIMHRS. In addition, DOD has not established a clear, well-defined process for maintaining effective communications to better prepare the Army to deploy DIMHRS. 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