January 25, 2022

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Former Bureau of Prisons Corrections Officer Sentenced for Sexually Abusing an Inmate and Witness Tampering

16 min read
<div>Eric Todd Ellis, 32, a former Bureau of Prisons (BOP) corrections officer at the FCI-Aliceville facility in Aliceville, Alabama, was sentenced today in federal court in Birmingham, Alabama, to 18 months in prison and five years of supervised release. Ellis previously pleaded guilty to one count of sexual abuse of a ward and one count of tampering with a witness.</div>
Eric Todd Ellis, 32, a former Bureau of Prisons (BOP) corrections officer at the FCI-Aliceville facility in Aliceville, Alabama, was sentenced today in federal court in Birmingham, Alabama, to 18 months in prison and five years of supervised release. Ellis previously pleaded guilty to one count of sexual abuse of a ward and one count of tampering with a witness.

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