Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State
The United States has designated Saleh Mesfer Alshaer, commander of the Houthi-controlled military logistics organization, for engaging in acts that directly or indirectly threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen, pursuant to Executive Order 13611. This action follows the United Nations Security Council’s Yemen Sanctions Committee’s designation of Alshaer on November 9, 2021.
Alshaer heads the Houthis’ “judicial guard” and is a key figure in Houthi efforts to seize assets from their opposition. The Houthis’ so-called “Specialized Criminal Court” in Sana’a has appointed Alshaer as the “judicial custodian” of those funds and assets. Alshaer’s associates have appropriated more than half the revenues from multiple hospitals in Sana’a, exacerbating Yemen’s dire health crisis. Alshaer also serves as a senior officer and commander of the logistics support authority for the Houthi forces, and he has assisted the Houthis in acquiring smuggled weapons.
This action is a message to the people of Yemen that the United States stands with them. We will not relent in targeting those who are perpetuating the humanitarian crisis in Yemen and seeking to profit from the suffering of the Yemeni people.
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