December 4, 2021

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Department of Justice Antitrust Division and Federal Trade Commission to Hold Workshop on Promoting Competition in Labor Markets

8 min read
<div>The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) will jointly host a virtual public workshop on Dec. 6 and 7, to discuss efforts to promote competitive labor markets and worker mobility. The workshop will bring together lawyers, economists, academics, policy experts, labor groups and workers, and will cover recent developments at the intersection of antitrust and labor, as well as implications for efforts to protect and empower workers through competition enforcement and rulemaking.  </div>
The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) will jointly host a virtual public workshop on Dec. 6 and 7, to discuss efforts to promote competitive labor markets and worker mobility. The workshop will bring together lawyers, economists, academics, policy experts, labor groups and workers, and will cover recent developments at the intersection of antitrust and labor, as well as implications for efforts to protect and empower workers through competition enforcement and rulemaking.  

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  • Environmental Safety International Inc. and its Agents to Pay $1.66 Million for Telemarketing Violations
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  • Weapon System Requirements: Joint Staff Lacks Reliable Data on the Effectiveness of Its Revised Joint Approval Process
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    What GAO Found The Department of Defense (DOD) sets the foundation of its weapon system acquisitions in documented requirements for new or enhanced capabilities. DOD's Joint Staff uses the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process to manage the review and approval of capability requirements documents. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) oversees the process. At congressional direction, the Joint Staff revised the process in November 2018, reducing the JROC's role to focus on documents addressing requirements of multiple departments, while increasing the role of military departments for their unique capability documents. GAO found that the Joint Staff lacks reliable data on the total number of programs that have completed the revised process. In addition, GAO found that Joint Staff data for the time to validate selected capability documents were also unreliable. Capability documents move through the JCIDS process in the Joint Staff's Knowledge Management and Decision Support (KM/DS) information system. GAO found discrepancies between KM/DS data and data from those that submit documents, known as sponsors. Joint Staff officials stated that deficiencies with the KM/DS system are at the root of its data issues. A detailed plan addressing these deficiencies will better position the Joint Staff to assess if the revised process is achieving stated JCIDS objectives. See figure below. The Joint Staff cannot assess the JCIDS process because it lacks reliable data and a baseline to measure timeliness. Joint Staff guidance provides a notional length of time of 103 days to review documents in the JCIDS process, but this is not evidence-based. Joint Staff officials stated they have not measured the actual length of time that documents take to go through the JCIDS process. GAO analysis and sponsor officials confirmed that none of the selected capability documents completed the process within 103 days. Sponsor officials noted that certain issues can add time to the review process and emphasized document quality over fast review and approval. However, without a data-driven baseline that reflects issues that affect the length of time to validate capability documents, Joint Staff officials are not able to assess JCIDS' efficiency and effectiveness. Discrepancies between Joint Staff and Sponsor Validation Timeline Data Note: One selected program is not included in the figure because the sponsor withdrew it from the process. Why GAO Did This Study In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Congress mandated revisions to the JCIDS process by modifying the scope of the JROC's responsibilities. The accompanying Senate Armed Services Committee report noted that these changes were, in part, to improve the timeliness of the JCIDS process. House Armed Services Committee report 116-120 included a provision for GAO to review the revisions to the JCIDS process. This report examines (1) key revisions to the process, (2) how many programs have been through the revised process and how long it took, and (3) the Joint Staff's ability to assess the timeliness of the process. GAO reviewed JCIDS policies and guidance, and interviewed relevant DOD officials. GAO also selected a nongeneralizable sample of 12 capability documents from across the Air Force, Army, and Navy. GAO analyzed data associated with these documents from the Joint Staff's KM/DS information system and compared it to data provided by military department officials to determine the Joint Staff's ability to assess the timeliness of the document review process.
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    In U.S GAO News
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  • Overseas Contingency Operations: Alternatives Identified to the Approach to Fund War- Related Activities
    In U.S GAO News
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  • Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed
    In U.S GAO News
    In January 2007, the President announced a new U.S. strategy to stem the violence in Iraq and help the Iraqi government foster conditions for national reconciliation. In The New Way Forward, the Administration articulated near-term goals to achieve over a 12- to 18-month period and reasserted the end state for Iraq: a unified, democratic, federal Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself and is an ally in the war on terror. To support this strategy, the United States increased its military presence and financial commitments for Iraq operations. This testimony discusses (1) progress in meeting key security, legislative, and economic goals of The New Way Forward; and (2) past and current U.S. strategies for Iraq and the need for an updated strategy. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from U.S. agencies, MNF-I, the UN, and the Iraqi government. GAO also had staff stationed in Baghdad. Since 2003, GAO has issued about 140 Iraq-related products, which provided baseline information for this assessment.The United States has made some progress in achieving key goals stated in The New Way Forward. Looking forward, many challenges remain, and an updated strategy is essential. In the security area, violence--as measured by the number of enemy-initiated attacks--decreased about 80 percent from June 2007 to June 2008, trained Iraqi security forces have increased substantially, and many units are leading counterinsurgency operations. However, as of July 2008, 8 of 18 provincial governments do not yet have lead responsibility for security in their provinces, and DOD reported that, in June 2008, less than 10 percent of Iraqi security forces were at the highest readiness level and therefore considered capable of performing operations without coalition support. The security environment remains volatile and dangerous. In the legislative area, Iraq has enacted key legislation to return some Ba'athists to government, grant amnesty to detained Iraqis, and define provincial powers. The unfinished Iraqi legislative agenda includes enacting laws that will provide the legal framework for sharing oil revenues, disarming militias, and holding provincial elections. On economic and infrastructure issues, Iraq spent only 24 percent of the $27 billion it budgeted for its reconstruction efforts between 2005 and 2007. Although crude oil production improved for short periods, the early July 2008 average production capacity of about 2.5 million barrels per day was below the U.S. goal of 3 million barrels per day. In addition, while State reports that U.S. goals for Iraq's water sector are close to being reached, the daily supply of electricity in Iraq met only slightly more than half of demand in early July 2008. Since 2003, the United States has developed and revised multiple strategies to address security and reconstruction needs in Iraq. The New Way Forward responded to failures in prior U.S. plans and the escalating violence that occurred in 2006. However, this strategy and the military surge that was central to it end in July 2008, and many agree that the situation remains fragile. GAO recommends an updated strategy for Iraq for several reasons. First, much has changed in Iraq since The New Way Forward began in January 2007. Violence is down, U.S. surge forces are leaving, and the United States is negotiating a security agreement with Iraq to replace the expiring UN mandate. Second, The New Way Forward only articulates U.S. goals and objectives for the phase that ends in July 2008. Third, the goals and objectives of The New Way Forward are contained in disparate documents rather than a single strategic plan. Furthermore, the classified MNF-I/U.S. Embassy Joint Campaign Plan is not a strategic plan; it is an operational plan with limitations that GAO will discuss during the closed portion of the hearing.
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