January 25, 2022

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Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador Sales Travels to Mozambique and South Africa

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Office of the Spokesperson

Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador Nathan A. Sales will travel to Maputo, Mozambique and Pretoria, South Africa this week to discuss terrorist threats in southern Africa.

On December 2 and 3 during meetings with senior Mozambican government officials, Ambassador Sales will discuss ongoing efforts to counter ISIS-linked terrorism in the country and the region. He also will explore ways the United States can help Mozambique enhance its civilian law enforcement capabilities and border security.

On December 4, Ambassador Sales will meet with South African officials to discuss the important role South Africa plays in regional security in Africa and ways to strengthen bilateral security cooperation.

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