At a roundtable with law enforcement in Albuquerque today, Attorney General William P. Barr announced updates on Operation Legend, which was expanded to Albuquerque on July 22, 2020.
Since Operation Legend’s launch in July 2020, more than 5,000 arrests – including approximately 247 for homicide – have been made; more than 2,000 firearms have been seized; and nearly 22 kilos of heroin, more than 15 kilos of fentanyl (enough to deliver more than 7.5 million fatal doses), more than 130 kilos of methamphetamine, more than 28 kilos of cocaine, and more than $7.3 million in drug proceeds have been seized.
Of the more than 5,000 individuals arrested, approximately 1,057 have been charged with federal offenses. Approximately 568 of those defendants have been charged with firearms offenses, while approximately 411 have been charged with drug-related crimes. The remaining defendants have been charged with various offenses.
The Attorney General launched the operation as a sustained, systematic, and coordinated law enforcement initiative in which federal law enforcement agencies work in conjunction with state and local law enforcement officials to fight violent crime.
Breakdown of Operation Legend charges:
The initiative, which was first launched first in Kansas City, MO., on July 8, 2020, is named in honor of four-year-old LeGend Taliferro, who was shot and killed while he slept early in the morning of June 29 in Kansas City. The operation was subsequently expanded to Chicago and Albuquerque on July 22, 2020; to Cleveland, Detroit, and Milwaukee on July 29, 2020; to St. Louis and Memphis on August 6, 2020; and to Indianapolis on August 14, 2020. A breakdown of the federal charges in each district is below.
Kansas City, MO.
136 defendants have been charged with federal crimes outlined below.
- 49 defendants have been charged with narcotics-related offenses;
- 76 defendants have been charged with firearms-related offenses; and
- 11 defendants have been charged with other violent crimes.
176 defendants have been charged with federal crimes outlined below.
- 40 defendants have been charged with narcotics-related offenses;
- 130 defendants have been charged with firearms-related offenses; and
- 6 defendants have been charged with other violent crimes.
113 defendants have been charged with federal crimes outlined below.
- 47 defendants have been charged with narcotics-related offenses;
- 56 defendants have been charged with firearms-related offenses; and
- 10 defendants have been charged with other violent crimes.
94 defendants have been charged with federal crimes outlined below.
- 54 defendants have been charged with narcotics-related offenses;
- 36 defendants have been charged with firearms-related offenses; and
- 4 defendants have been charged with other violent crimes.
96 defendants have been charged with federal offenses outlined below.
- 31 defendants have been charged with narcotics-related offenses;
- 62 defendants have been charged with firearms-related offenses; and
- 3 defendants have been charged with other violent crimes.
54 defendants have been charged with federal crimes outlined below.
- 25 defendants have been charged with narcotics-related offenses;
- 25 defendants have been charged with firearms-related offenses; and
- 4 defendant has been charged with other violent crimes.
St. Louis, MO.
274 defendants have been charged with federal crimes.
- 125 defendants have been charged with narcotics-related offenses;
- 125 defendants have been charged with firearms-related offenses; and
- 24 defendants have been charged with other violent crimes.
51 defendants have been charged with federal offenses.
- 30 defendants have been charged with narcotics-related offenses;
- 14 defendants have been charged with firearms-related offenses; and
- 7 defendants have been charged with other violent crimes.
65 defendants have been charged with federal crimes outlined below.
- 10 defendants have been charged with narcotics-related offenses;
- 46 defendants have been charged with firearms-related offenses; and
- 9 defendants have been charged with other violent crimes.
- Justice Department Settles Citizenship-Status Discrimination Against South Carolina Security Guard Firm Involving Former Interpreter for the U.S. Military in IraqBy Sam NewsOctober 6, 2020The Justice Department announced today that it reached a settlement with Security Management of South Carolina LLC (Security Management), a private security company that provides armed and unarmed security services throughout South Carolina and Georgia.[Read More…]
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- Software Development: DOD Faces Risks and Challenges in Implementing Modern Approaches and Addressing Cybersecurity PracticesBy Sam NewsJune 24, 2021What GAO Found According to the Department of Defense's (DOD) fiscal year (FY) 2021 budget request, DOD spent $2.8 billion on the 29 selected major business information technology (IT) programs in FY 2019. The department also reported that it planned to invest over $9.7 billion on these programs between FY 2020 and FY 2022. In addition, 20 of the 29 programs reported experiencing cost or schedule changes since January 2019. Program officials attributed cost and schedule changes to a variety of reasons, including modernization changes and requirements changes or delays. Seventeen of the 29 programs also reported experiencing challenges associated with the early impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, including the slowdown of contractors' software development efforts. DOD and GAO's assessments of program risk identified a range of program risk levels and indicated that some programs could be underreporting risks. Specifically, of the 22 programs that were actively using a register to manage program risks, DOD rated nine programs as low risk, 12 as medium risk, and one as high risk. In contrast, GAO rated seven as low risk, 12 as medium risk, and three as high risk. In total, GAO found 10 programs for which its numerical assessments of program risk reflected greater risk than reported by DOD, while DOD had three programs with greater reported risk than GAO. DOD officials noted that differences in risk levels might be associated with a variety of factors, including different risk assessment approaches. However, the differences in risk level GAO identified highlight the need for DOD to ensure that it is accurately reporting program risks. Until the department does so, oversight of some programs could be limited by overly optimistic risk perspectives. As of December 2020, program officials for the 22 major DOD business IT programs that were actively developing software reported using approaches that may help to limit cost and schedule risks. (See table.) Selected Software Development and Cybersecurity Approaches That May Limit Risks and Number of Major DOD Business IT Programs That Reported Using the Approach Software development and cybersecurity approaches that may limit risk Number of programs that reported using the approach Using off-the-shelf software 19 of 22 Implementing continuous iterative software development 18 of 22 Delivering software at least every 6 monthsa 16 of 22 Developing or planning to develop a cybersecurity strategy 21 of 22 Conducting developmental cybersecurity testing 16 of 22 Conducting operational cybersecurity testing 15 of 22 Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense questionnaire responses. | GAO-21-351aThe Defense Innovation Board encourages more frequent delivery of working software to users for Agile and DevOps practices. Program officials also reported facing a variety of software development challenges while implementing these approaches. These included difficulties finding and hiring staff, transitioning from waterfall to Agile software development, and managing technical environments. DOD's continued efforts to address these challenges will be critical to the department's implementation of modern software development approaches. DOD has also made organizational and policy changes intended to improve the management of its IT acquisitions, such as taking steps to implement Agile software development and improve data transparency. In addition, to address statutory requirements, DOD has taken steps to remove the department's chief management officer (CMO) position. However, the department had not yet sufficiently implemented these changes. Officials from many of the 18 programs GAO assessed that reported using Agile development reported that DOD had implemented activities associated with Agile transition best practices to only some or little to no extent, indicating that the department had not sufficiently implemented best practices. For example, 12 of the 18 programs reported that DOD's life-cycle activities only supported Agile methods to some or little to no extent. Program officials also reported challenges associated with implementing Agile software development. The department has a variety of efforts underway to help with its implementation of Agile software development. DOD officials stated that the department's transition to Agile will take years and will require sustained engagement throughout DOD. In addition, DOD has taken steps aimed at improving the sharing and transparency of data it uses to monitor its acquisitions. According to a November 2020 proposal from the Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment, DOD officials are to develop data strategies and metrics to assess performance for the department's acquisition pathways. However, as of February 2021, DOD did not have data strategies and had not finalized metrics for the two pathways associated with the programs discussed in this report. Officials said they were working with DOD programs and components to finalize initial pathway metrics. They stated that they plan to implement them in fiscal year 2021 and continue to refine and adjust them over the coming years. Without important data from acquistion pathways and systems, DOD risks not having timely quantitative insight into program performance, including its acquisition reform efforts. Finally, DOD's CMO position was eliminated by a statute enacted in January 2021. This position was responsible for key efforts associated with the department's business systems modernization, which has been on GAO's High Risk List since 1995. DOD plans to take steps to address the uncertainty associated with the recent elimination of the position. Why GAO Did This Study For fiscal year 2021, DOD requested approximately $37.7 billion for IT investments. These investments included major business IT programs, which are intended to help the department carry out key business functions, such as financial management and health care. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 included a provision for GAO to assess selected IT programs annually through March 2023. GAO's objectives for this review were to (1) summarize DOD's reported performance of its portfolio of IT acquisition programs and the reasons for this performance; (2) evaluate DOD's assessments of program risks; (3) summarize DOD's approaches to software development and cybersecurity and identify associated challenges; and (4) evaluate how selected organizational and policy changes could affect IT acquisitions. To address these objectives, GAO selected 29 major business IT programs that DOD reported to the federal IT Dashboard (a public website that includes information on the performance of major IT investments) as of September 2020. GAO reviewed planned expenditures for these programs, from fiscal years 2019 through 2022, as reported in the department's FY 2021 budget request. It also aggregated program office responses to a GAO questionnaire that requested information about cost and schedule changes that occurred since January 2019 and the early impacts of COVID-19. GAO also analyzed the risks of the 22 programs that were actively using central repositories known as risk registers to manage program risks. GAO used these registers to create program risk ratings, and then compared its ratings to those of the DOD chief information officer (CIO). In addition, GAO aggregated DOD program office responses to the questionnaire that requested information about the software and cybersecurity practices used by 22 of the 29 IT programs that were actively developing software. GAO compared the responses to relevant guidance and leading practices. GAO reviewed selected IT-related organizational and policy changes and reviewed reports and documentation related to the effects of these changes on IT acquisitions. GAO also aggregated program office responses to the questionnaire that requested information about DOD's implementation of these changes. This included information on DOD's implementation of best practices as part of its efforts to implement Agile software development. GAO met with relevant DOD officials to discuss each of the topics addressed in this report.[Read More…]
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- Medicare: Provider Performance and Experiences Under the Merit-Based Incentive Payment SystemBy Sam NewsOctober 1, 2021What GAO Found The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) administers the Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) under the Medicare program. Under this system, MIPS-eligible providers receive a “final score” based on their performance on certain measures in four categories, such as quality and cost of care. This final score is compared to a performance threshold and is used to determine if providers receive a negative, neutral, or positive payment adjustment applied to future Medicare payments. Providers may receive a larger positive adjustment if their final score surpasses a higher threshold, known as the exceptional performance threshold. In addition, eligible providers who do not submit required performance data may receive a negative adjustment. Analysis of CMS data shows that final scores were generally high and at least 93 percent of providers earned a small positive adjustment in 2017 through 2019, with the largest payment adjustment in any year being 1.88 percent. Median final scores were well above the performance threshold across each of the 3 years (see figure). About 72 to 84 percent of providers earned an exceptional performance bonus, depending on the year. Median Final Scores Relative to Performance and Exceptional Performance Thresholds, Performance Years 2017 through 2019 Stakeholders GAO interviewed identified some strengths and challenges related to the MIPS program. For example, two of the 11 stakeholders stated that bonus points, such as those that may be added to the final scores for small practices, helped increase scores for certain providers who might otherwise be disadvantaged. Eight stakeholders questioned whether the program helps to meaningfully improve quality of care or patient health outcomes. For example, they said that the design of the program may incentivize reporting over quality improvement, with providers choosing to report on quality measures on which they are performing well, rather than on measures in areas where they may need improvement. According to CMS, the MIPS Value Pathways (MVP)—a new way of meeting reporting requirements in 2023—will help to address some of these challenges by standardizing performance measurement across specific specialties, medical conditions, or episodes of care. The development of clinically cohesive sets of measures and activities should minimize providers' selection burden in choosing measures and activities to report for each MVP, officials said. Why GAO Did This Study The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA) changed how Medicare pays for physician services, moving from a payment system that largely rewarded volume and complexity of health care services to the Quality Payment Program, which is a payment incentive program intended to reward high-quality, efficient care. Providers participate in the Quality Payment Program through one of two tracks: MIPS or advanced alternative payment models. MIPS was designed to incentivize high-quality care through performance-based payment adjustments. About 950,000 providers (about half of all Medicare Part B providers) were eligible to participate in MIPS in 2019. Congress included a provision in MACRA for GAO to examine the MIPS program. This report describes (1) the distribution of MIPS performance scores and related payment adjustments, and (2) stakeholders' perspectives on the strengths and challenges of the MIPS program. GAO analyzed MIPS data for performance years 2017 through 2019—the most recent year available at the time of GAO's analysis. GAO also interviewed officials from CMS and 11 selected professional organizations that represent MIPS-eligible providers of various specialties. GAO identified stakeholders through research and its analysis of the MIPS data. The Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. For more information, contact Jessica Farb at (202) 512-7114 or FarbJ@gao.gov.[Read More…]
- Military Training: Observations on the Army’s Implementation of a Metric for Measuring Ground Force TrainingBy Sam NewsAugust 31, 2021What GAO FoundThe full spectrum training mile metric is similar in some ways to the tank mile metric and dissimilar in other ways. Both metrics measure training activity of nondeployed units associated with recommended training events based on the Army's approved training strategy. Specifically, they both calculate the average number of miles a unit is expected to drive its vehicles on an annual basis for training that occurs during the reset and train/ready stages of the Armys Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle.However, the full spectrum training mile metric applies to all Army components (active component, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard) while the tank mile metric does not apply to the Army Reserve, because the Army Reserve does not have tanks. The full spectrum training mile metric also is based on multiple vehicles including the M1 Abrams tank, M2/M3 Bradley, Stryker, up-armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle, medium tactical vehicle, and palletized load system, while the tank mile metric is limited to the M1 Abrams tank. According to Army officials, the full spectrum training mile metricand its incorporation of a wider array of vehiclesis more reflective of the type of vehicles the Army is actually using to train its ground forces for full spectrum operations.The Armys full spectrum training mile metric is based on certain assumptions associated with standards set in the Armys training strategy and force-generation model. Because the metric is a standard for actual training to be measured against, the metrics assumptions are based on desired or expected conditions and may not fully align with actual conditions. For example, the Army made certain assumptions about the length of time units would spend in each stage of the ARFORGEN cycle, assumed that units would have all the vehicles that were included in their modified table of organization and equipment, and assumed units would accomplish all the training in the Armys training strategy. However, prior GAO reports and Army readiness reports have both shown that units do not always have all the equipment, including vehicles included in their modified table of organization and equipment, available when they are conducting training. Army officials have also acknowledged that many units are not currently executing the ARFORGEN training cycle and the Armys training strategy as envisioned. To the extent that units do not have all of their equipment, including vehicles, or complete all recommended training, the units actual miles driven may differ from the Armys full spectrum training mile metric. According to a responsible Army official, the Army tracks historical data on actual miles driven and has, in the past, adjusted assumptions used to develop its tank mile metric to more closely reflect actual conditions. The Army plans to continue this practice now with the new metric in place. For example, when conducting its 2010 training strategy review, the Army reduced its estimated miles per training day and event to more closely reflect actual miles driven.The Army uses the full spectrum training mile metric to measure training activity. Specifically, the Army compares the actual miles its units have driven to conduct ground force training to its full spectrum training mile metric to determine how well it executed its training strategy. However, the Army does not use the full spectrum training mile metric to develop its training cost estimates or related funding needs. The Army uses its Training Resource Model, rather than its full spectrum training mile metric, to develop its training cost estimates and funding needs. While some of the inputs to the full spectrum training mile metric and the Training Resource Model are the same (i.e., the number and duration of training events and the numbers of units and vehicles available for training) the Training Resource Model contains unique inputs, such as cost factors that are not related to the full spectrum training mile metric. Specifically, the cost calculation in the Training Resource Model includes the cost to drive a vehicle, expressed as cost per mile, that are linked to the number of units and vehicles, as well as other indirect nonmileage support costs, such as civilian pay. The Training Resource Model, like the full spectrum training mile metric, assumes, among other things, that all recommended training events will be fully executed. To the extent that all training does not occur or other assumptions do not hold true, requirements could differ from estimates derived from the Training Resource Model. According to an Army official, the Training Resource Model is one of several sources of information the Army considers when developing its funding requests for training. For example, the official stated the Army uses historical data on actual miles driven to adjust its funding requests to more closely reflect actual conditions.Why GAO Did This StudyIn 2008, the Army issued a field manual that identified the need to expand its training focus so units would be trained and ready to operate across a full spectrum of operations including offensive, defensive, stability, and civil support operations. To support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, for the last several years, the Army has focused its ground force training on preparing units for counterinsurgency operations. With the withdrawal from operations in Iraq, fewer units are engaged in counterinsurgency operations and now have more time to train for full spectrum operations.To reflect the shift in training focus, the Army, in April 2011, updated its training strategy and also established a new metric to measure training activityreferred to as the full spectrum training mile metric. This metric replaced the Armys traditional tank mile metric, which represented the average number of miles the Army expected to drive its tanks while conducting training. In its fiscal year 2012 budget materials, the Army provided background information on its transition to the new metric, and, starting in fiscal year 2012, began using the new metric.House report 112-78 directed GAO to review the Armys transition to the full spectrum training mile metric and report its findings by February 28, 2012. To address this mandate, we determined (1) how the Army's full spectrum training mile metric differs from its traditional tank mile metric; (2) the key assumptions associated with the full spectrum training mile metric and to what extent these assumptions reflect actual conditions; and (3) to what extent the Army uses the full spectrum training mile metric to measure training execution and develop training cost estimates and related funding needs. Additionally, for background purposes, this report includes information on how training is reflected in the Armys operation and maintenance budget-justification materials.For more information, contact Sharon L. Pickup at 202-512-9619 or email@example.com.[Read More…]
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- Stabilizing Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Budget and Management Challenges of Iraq’s Security MinistriesBy Sam NewsAugust 25, 2021In November 2005, the President issued the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. According to the strategy, victory will be achieved when Iraq is peaceful, united, stable, secure, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terror. To help Iraq achieve this, the U.S. is, among other efforts, helping strengthen the capabilities of the Iraq Ministries of Defense and Interior (police forces) so they can assume greater responsibility for the country's security. The United States has provided about $15.4 billion to develop Iraqi security forces and institutions. In this testimony, GAO discusses preliminary observations on (1) U.S. and Iraqi funding to develop and sustain the Iraqi security forces, and (2) key challenges the United States and Iraq face in improving the security ministries' operations and management. This statement is based on prior GAO reports, recent fieldwork in Iraq and Department of Defense, U.S. Treasury and Embassy budget documents. GAO added information to this statement in response to comments from Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq. We completed the work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.In March 2007, DOD reported that Iraq will increase its 2007 security budget from $5.4 billion to $7.3 billion (a 37-percent increase). DOD states this increase provides evidence of the country's growing self-sufficiency and commitment to security. However, our analysis shows that some of this increase is due to the appreciation of the Iraqi dinar against the dollar. Using a constant exchange rate, Iraq's 2007 security budget grows by 15 percent. Also, Iraq faced problems spending its 2006 security budget. As of November 2006, the Iraq Ministry of Defense had spent only about 1 percent of its capital goods budget for weapons, ammunition, and vehicles. DOD has requested $5.8 billion in additional U.S. funds to help purchase these items for Iraq and provide assistance to its security ministries. The United States and Iraq face personnel and logistical challenges in developing ministries that can sustain Iraq's growing security forces. For example, the ministries have inadequate systems to account for personnel and inexperienced staff with limited budgeting and technology skills. Also, both security ministries have difficulties acquiring, distributing, and maintaining weapons, vehicles, and equipment. The U.S.-led coalition has provided significant resources to develop Iraq's security forces and has 215 military and civilian advisors at the ministries. The United States signed a foreign military sales agreement with Iraq that, according to U.S. officials, allows Iraq to bypass its ineffective procurement systems to purchase equipment directly from the United States. Iraq has deposited $1.9 billion into its account for foreign military sales. However, it is unclear whether this program will help improve the ministries' procurement and contracting capacity.[Read More…]
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- Disaster Housing: Improved Cost Data and Guidance Would Aid FEMA Activation DecisionsBy Sam NewsDecember 15, 2020The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) relied primarily on rental assistance payments to assist 2017 and 2018 hurricane survivors but also used direct housing programs to address housing needs, as shown in the table below. GAO found that FEMA provided rental assistance to about 746,000 households and direct housing assistance to about 5,400 households. FEMA did not use the Disaster Housing Assistance Program (DHAP)—a pilot grant program managed jointly with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)—because FEMA viewed its direct housing programs to be more efficient and cost-effective and did not consider DHAP to be a standard post-disaster housing assistance program. Number of Households Affected by the 2017 and 2018 Hurricanes That Received Rental and Direct Temporary Housing Assistance, by State or Territory State or territory Rental assistance Direct housing assistance Florida 422,230 1,241 North Carolina 20,198 656 Puerto Rico 147,620 414 Texas 143,465 2,988 U.S. Virgin Islands 12,147 69 Total number of households 745,660 5,368 Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). | GAO-21-116 Notes: FEMA provided the vast majority of its direct housing assistance through transportable temporary housing units such as manufactured housing. Rental assistance data are as of February 13, 2020, and direct housing assistance data are as of July 15, 2020. FEMA's analyses of the cost-effectiveness of housing assistance programs were limited because program cost data were incomplete or not readily useable. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act requires FEMA to consider factors including cost-effectiveness when determining which types of housing assistance to provide. Although FEMA has stated its direct housing programs were relatively more cost-effective than DHAP, FEMA generally could not support these statements with cost data. Specifically, FEMA does not collect key program data in its system, such as monthly subsidy and administrative costs, in a manner that would allow it to analyze the full costs of providing the assistance. Without such information, the agency's program activation decisions will not be well informed, particularly with regard to cost-effectiveness. FEMA policy guidance also says that FEMA is to compare the projected costs of the direct housing programs it is considering activating, but does not consistently specify what cost information to consider, such as whether to use both programmatic and administrative costs. Without such guidance, FEMA cannot reasonably assure that its assessments and their results incorporate consistent and comparable data. The 2017 and 2018 hurricanes (Harvey, Irma, Maria, Florence, and Michael) caused $325 billion in damage. FEMA provided post-disaster assistance, including rental and direct housing assistance. DHAP was a pilot grant program that provided temporary rental assistance and was used to respond to several hurricanes before 2017. GAO was asked to review issues related to major disasters in 2018 and housing assistance provided after the 2017 and 2018 hurricanes. This report (1) describes the assistance FEMA provided in response to those hurricanes, and (2) evaluates the extent to which FEMA considered cost-effectiveness in activating programs. GAO reviewed FEMA and HUD policies, communications, and other documentation; analyzed FEMA data; and interviewed officials at FEMA headquarters and regional offices, HUD, and Texas state and local government offices. GAO makes two recommendations to FEMA for its temporary housing programs: (1) identify and make changes to its data systems to allow for capture and analysis of programs' full costs, and (2) specify the information needed to compare projected program costs in its guidance on activating programs. DHS agreed with both recommendations, and said it planned to implement them in 2021–2022. For more information, contact John Pendleton at (202) 512-8678 or firstname.lastname@example.org.[Read More…]
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- Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Changes in Global Hawk’s Acquisition Strategy Are Needed to Reduce Program RisksBy Sam NewsAugust 31, 2021Global Hawk offers significant military capabilities to capture and quickly transmit high-quality images of targets and terrain, day or night, and in adverse weather--without risk to an onboard pilot. Global Hawk first flew in the late 1990s as a demonstrator and supported recent combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2001, the Air Force began an acquisition program to develop and produce improved Global Hawks. In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) restructured and accelerated the program to include a new, larger and more capable air vehicle. GAO was asked to review the program and discuss (1) the restructuring's effect on the Air Force's ability to deliver new capabilities to the warfighter and (2) whether its current business case and management approach is knowledge-based and can help forestall future risks.The restructuring of the Global Hawk program impacts the acquisition program in multiple ways. More and accelerated funding: Funding, which previously spanned 20 years, now is compressed in about half the time. The restructured plan requires $6.3 billion through fiscal year 2012; the original plan would have needed $3.4 billion by that time. The budget request is now three times higher for some years. Immature technologies: Several critical technologies needed to provide the advanced capabilities are immature and will not be tested on the new air vehicle until late in the program, after which most of the air vehicles will already have been bought. New requirements, new costs: DOD's desire to add additional Global Hawk capabilities tripled development costs. The program acquisition unit cost increased 44 percent since program start, yet fewer vehicles are to be produced than originally planned. Challenges, trade-offs, and delays: The addition of new capabilities has led to space, weight, and power constraints for the advanced Global Hawk model. These limitations may result in deferring some capabilities. Some key events and activities--many related to testing issues--have been delayed. Global Hawk's highly concurrent development and production strategy is risky and runs counter in important ways to a knowledge-based approach and to DOD's acquisition guidance. The restructuring caused gaps in product knowledge, increasing the likelihood of unsuccessful cost, schedule, quality, and performance outcomes. Because the restructured program is dramatically different from the initial plan for the basic model, the business case now seems out of sync with the realities of the acquisition program.[Read More…]
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