January 29, 2022

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Angola Travel Advisory

8 min read

Reconsider travel to Angola due to COVID-19.

Read the Department of State’s COVID-19 page before you plan any international travel.   

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has issued a Level 3 Travel Health Notice for Angola due to COVID-19.  

Angola has lifted stay at home orders, and resumed some transportation options and business operations.  Visit the Embassy’s COVID-19 page for more information on COVID-19 in Angola. 

Exercise increased caution in:

  • Urban areas due to crime and kidnapping.

Read the country information page.

If you decide to travel to Angola:

Urban areas

Violent crime, such as armed robbery, assault, kidnapping, carjacking, and homicide, is common. Local police lack the resources to respond effectively to serious criminal incidents

Last Update: Reissued with updates to COVID-19 information. 

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